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Recent Publications
Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World. By Jos6 Trias
Monge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. Pp. v, 228. Price:
$35.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Christina Duffy Burnett.
Ask yourself why you are reading a review of a book about a colony
called Puerto Rico in a journal on international law. Isn't Puerto Rico a selfgoverning Commonwealth? Isn't it part of the United States? If you decide
to buy the book, ask yourself where in the bookstore you should look for it.
In the international relations section? The U.S. history section? A turn-ofthe-century Supreme Court case analyzing the status of Puerto Rico (and

other territories "acquired" by the United States in 1901) may provide some
guidance: Puerto Rico is "foreign in a domestic sense."' Perhaps the

bookstore has a section on "not really foreign" countries or "more-or-less
domestic" territories. Try using other phrases that have described Puerto

Rico over the past century to refine your search: "Possession." 2 "'A sort of
an autonomous dependency'" (p. 105). 3 "Unique." 4 You may have to go to
the information desk.
The subtitle of Jos6 Trias Monge's book is on the mark; the term
"colony" most accurately describes Puerto Rico. For one hundred years, the
island has been an "unincorporated territory," which means that the United
States has no intention of making it a state anytime soon, if ever.5 It is

subject to the plenary power of Congress under the Territorial Clause of the
1.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341-42 (1901) (White, J., concurring). Downes, one
of the "Insular Cases" of 1901, created the doctrine of "territorial incorporation" to justify keeping
the then-newly acquired territories, without the intent of incorporating them into the Union as states.
The other Insular Cases were Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182
U.S. 392 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182
U.S. 222 (1901); Grossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S.
221 (1901); and De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). A series of cases between 1901 and 1922
dealt with similar issues; in 1922, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of territorial
incorporation set forth in Downes. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
2.
See, for example, the question-begging title of James Bradley Thayer, Our New
Possessions, 12 HARV. L. Rev. 464 (1899), which discussed whether (and how) the United States
should keep the territories it had acquired at the end of the Spanish-American War. There are
numerous references to Puerto Rico as a "possession" throughout the last century. See, e.g., Downes,
182 U.S. at 341-42; Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View, 13
HARV. L. REv. 155 (1899).
3.
Senator Robert A. Taft described Puerto Rico in these terms in his remarks during the
1943 debate on the Tydings Bill of that year (p. 105).
4.
See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474 (1979).
5.
See Downes, 182 U.S. at 339-42 (White, I., concurring). The U.S. Supreme Court has
reaffirmed Puerto Rico's status as an "unincorporated territory." See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651
(1980).
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U.S. Constitution.6 Residents of Puerto Rico have been U.S. citizens since

1917, but they have been denied representation in Congress except for a
non-voting Resident Commissioner,7 and they may not vote in presidential
elections. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit held that consecutive trials in the
local courts of Puerto Rico and the federal courts in Florida violated the
prohibition against double jeopardy, because Puerto Rico's power to punish

does not emanate from a separate sovereign. 8

It might come as a surprise, then, to discover that Trias Monge's use

of the term "colony" has caused an uproar in Puerto Rico. This is not
because nobody there believes the term applies to the island-many have for
a long time, and still do-but rather, because Trias Monge was among the

architects of the Commonwealth

status9 his book maligns."0

The

Commonwealth Party leadership has long denied that this status is colonial.
Many Puerto Ricans, through their support of the party, have agreed. If,
then, Trias Monge thinks the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a colony,
why did he participate in its creation? If this status has obviously colonial
attributes, why do so many Puerto Ricans support it?" More importantly, if

so many Puerto Ricans seem not to mind these colonial attributes, then why
should it matter now, half a century later, if Puerto Rico is indeed a
"colony"?
It matters a great deal, argues Trias Monge, and his book gives a
potent account of the reasons. He provides a rich yet succinct history of the
evolution of the status question as a persistent problem in Puerto Rican
politics; he calls, urgently, for a resolution to this problem (although the
parameters of his proposal remain, frustratingly, too vague); and he insists
6.
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl.
2 ("The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territories and other Property of the United
States.").
7.
The position is currently held by the Honorable Carlos Romero Barccl6, former
Governor of Puerto Rico. The position of Resident Commissioner is elective. The Resident
Commissioner of Puerto Rico serves in the House of Representatives and, together with the Delegates
from Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Washington, D.C., may serve and vote in
Committee. The fifth populated U.S. territory, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
(CNMI), has only a Resident Representative to the United States who lives in Washington, D.C., but
is not a member of Congress. None of the territories has a representative in the Senate. For an
explanation of representation of U.S. territories in Congress, see GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, No.
GAO/OGC-98-5, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN; and Abraham Holtzman, Empire and Representation:
7he U.S. Congress, XI:2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 249 (1986).
8.
United States v. Sdnchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1151-53 (1lth Cir. 1993). But see United
States v. L6pez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding Puerto Rico sovereign for purposes
of double jeopardy doctrine); cf United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding Indian tribes
sovereign for purposes of double jeopardy and contrasting lack of sovereignty of territorial
governments to "unique and limited" sovereignty of Indian tribes).
9.
"Commonwealth" is the mistranslation of "Estado Libre Asociado," which literally
translated would be "Free Associated State."
10. For a thoughtful discussion of the more and less negative connotations of the word
"colony" in the context of U.S.-Puerto Rico relations, see Judge Jos6 A. Cabranes, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Speech at the Foreign in a Domestic Sense Conference at Yale Law
School (Mar. 27, 1998).
11. In a 1993 plebiscite, Puerto Ricans voted 49% in favor of "enhanced" Commonwealth
status (p. 135).
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that Congress must express a clear position on the status options acceptable
to it, beyond its now tiresome assurances that it will "respect" the will of the
Puerto Rican people. In one of many memorable lines in a book suffused
with wit and wisdom, Trias Monge charges: "Let the Puerto Ricans choose,
it is grandly said. Choose what?" (p. 3).
The most important achievement of the book is its challenge to the idea
that Puerto Rico's ambiguous status poses no problem because its people
have, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, democratically
chosen this status. As a major participant in the events that led to the
creation of Commonwealth status, Trias Monge is in an excellent position to
explain why, after a convention establishing the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a vote of 76.5% approving Commonwealth
status, and its victory in two subsequent plebiscites, 2 Puerto Rico is still a
colony, and status is still a problem.
The problem is this: The people of Puerto Rico approved
Commonwealth status in 1952 under what appears to have been the
widespread misunderstanding that it was merely a transitional status and that
it represented a partial grant of sovereignty by Congress to Puerto Rico. 13
Congress consistently has stonewalled subsequent attempts by Puerto Rican
political leaders and delegates in Washington to "enhance" this status. 4 The
people of Puerto Rico chose not Commonwealth, but "enhanced"
Commonwealth, in a 1967 plebiscite; 5 Congress failed to grant the
requested enhancements. The people chose "enhanced" Commonwealth
again in 1993, this time with a forty-nine percent vote; once more, these
enhancements were rejected (although this time, with statements far less
ambiguous than Trias Monge acknowledges).' 6 Thus, as the author confirms,
the people of Puerto Rico have not democratically chosen their current
status. Instead, they have asked Congress for a status different from the
current one ever since the very year they achieved it. As Trias Monge puts
it: "So much for self-determination." (p. 132).
The book begins with an account of Spanish rule on the island, which
lasted four centuries, until the United States won the Spanish-American War
12.

The second plebiscite took place in 1967, and Commonwealth, "purged of its colonial

connotations," won (p. 130). A version of Commonwealth won a third plebiscite, in 1993, but this
time by a three-percent margin (p. 135).
13. For a discussion of this contested status and an assessment of the confusion and
obfuscation surrounding its origins, see JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO
Rco: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 160-200 (1985); and 4 Jost TRIAS MONGE,
HISTORA CONSTITUCIONAL DE PUERTO Rico, ch. 39 (1980-1983 & 1994).
14. See, for example, Trias Monge's discussion of the Fern6s-Murray Bill (pp. 126-29) and
of various proposed bills between 1989 and 1991 (pp. 133-34). More importantly, a recent and
extremely controversial bill, the Young Bill (introduced in the House by Representative Don Young of
Alaska) rejected the Commonwealth Party's proposed enhancements. See infra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text.
15.

See 4 TRfAs MONGE, supra note 13, at 244-46.

16.

See infra note 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing Young Bill); see also H.R.

3024, 104th Cong. (1996) (original version of Young Bill); Don Young, Chairman, House Committee

on Resources, Press Release on "United States-Puerto Rico Political Status Act" (Mar. 6, 1996).
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in 1898 and took as spoils of war the islands of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Philippines. 7 Throughout the book, Trias Monge recalls the final shining
moment in Puerto Rico's relationship with Spain: the Autonomic Charter of
1897, granted to Cuba and Puerto Rico by the Spanish government.' 8 While,
as Trias Monge rightly observes, the Autonomic Charter has been "unduly
romanticized by many" (p. 15), it granted these islands autonomy'9 greater
than that possessed by any Caribbean colony until after the Second World
War, and arguably greater than that the United States has granted Puerto
Rico to date-particularly because it included representation in the Spanish
Parliament along with Spanish citizenship. The Autonomic Charter thus
granted the islands increased autonomy without full independence or full
incorporation into the metropolis, a central theme of Trfas Monge's book
and of the Commonwealth Party's platform.
With the Autonomic Charter as a backdrop and something of a baseline
standard, Trfas Monge embarks on the story of Puerto Rico's relationship
with the United States. Its early stages are best summarized as a painful and
embarrassing story of hypocrisy and paternalism, beginning with an
infamous decree by General Nelson A. Miles proclaiming the arrival of the
United States and the "blessings of enlightened civilization." In a chapter
laced with exquisite sarcasm, Trias Monge observes that the first military
governor "started acquainting Puerto Ricans with the blessings of
enlightened civilization by suppressing Parliament, and the . . Diputaci6n
Provincial and making extensive changes in the judicial system" (p. 31).
Chapters 3 through 9 present a tightly woven history of the next five
decades in the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship, focusing on the evolution of
the island's political parties and the ways in which these shaped and were
shaped by the ubiquitous status debate. These chapters recount a history
marked by occasional watershed moments in Congressional legislation over
Puerto Rico granting powers of self-government inch by excruciating inch;
in the interstices of these fits of absent-minded imperialism, the political life
of Puerto Rico took shape in the form of parties inevitably defined by their
positions on the status question.
The first of these Congressional moments of activity, the Foraker Act
of 1900,2° created a civil government headed by a Governor appointed by
the President of the United States; after much debate, most of it concerning
the "fitness" of the inhabitants of the new "possessions" to govern
themselves, the Act failed to grant U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans. 2'
17.

Treaty of Peace, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754. The United States also took

Cuba, but only temporarily. See id. art. I.
18. See 1 TRfAS MONGE, supra note 13, chs. 7-8.
19.
"Autonomy" is a vague term. I use it here because it has long been used in Puerto Rico
to describe a variety of status options somewhere in between independence and full incorporation into
the United States as a state, most notably by members of the Commonwealth Party to describe the
status they seek. Trias Monge asserts the connection between the Autonomic Charter and "autonomist

thinking" in Puerto Rico (p. 14).
20. Ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-916 (1994)).
21.

For a detailed account of the history of the U.S. citizenship of Puerto Ricans, see Jost
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Congress' next major move took place in 1917 with the passage of the Jones
Act,22 under which "American citizenship was conferred in a most inelegant
way" (p. 72). With the renewal of the rhetoric of self-determination after the
Second World War came the Elective Governor Act,2" under which Luis
Mufioz Marn, the founder of the Partido Popular Democrdtico or
"Commonwealth Party" and primary inventor of the status of that name,
became the island's first elected governor. Here Trias Monge's analysis
turns to a detailed explanation of the events of 1950-52: the creation of
Commonwealth status, the Constitutional convention, and the victory of Luis
Mufioz Marn at the polls.
The next four chapters describe the genesis of Commonwealth status
and its would-be trial by fire before the Decolonization Committee of the
United Nations," examine subsequent attempts to understand the true
meaning of this status, and discuss other attempts at postcolonial
arrangements in the Caribbean and in U.S. territories. Among the models
that inspired Commonwealth status, Trias Monge identifies the Statute of
Westminster, "which stated that no British law would apply to the
dominions, except at their request or with their consent, and that the
dominions could repeal any British law until then applicable to them" (p.
110). Trias Monge describes the United States' success, upon the creation of
Commonwealth status and the approval of the Constitution of Puerto Rico,
in removing Puerto Rico from the Decolonization Committee's list of nonself-governing territories. The removal was premised on the theory that
Puerto Rico had entered into a "bilateral compact" with the United States
which could not be altered without the consent of both parties,
notwithstanding the embodiment of this "compact" in a federal statute.'
Chapters 10 and 11 rely primarily on Congressional hearings and
administrative reports, while Chapter 12 cites U.N. resolutions and
documents. Not until Chapter 13 does Trias Monge's analysis of origins of
Commonwealth status cite American case law,26 and then without discussion.
Yet the events before the United Nations occurred the same summer that
Mora v. Mejias,27 the first federal court decision analyzing Puerto Rico's
status, was decided. Although this case has long been characterized as
noncommittal on the question of the contested "bilateral compact" theory,
the Court of Appeals did reject the District Court's reasoning that Puerto
Rico's new status meant the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee no
longer applied to Puerto Rico due to the island's status as a territory, but
A.

CABRANES,

CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: NOTES ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF

(1979).
22. Ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 737 (1994)).
23. 61 Stat. 770 (1947).
24. This review uses the term "would-be" because the United States made representations
suggesting a change in the status of the island which subsequently turned out to be seriously
misleading. See, e.g., TORRUELLA, supra note 13, at 160-200.
25. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731916 (1994)).
26. Chapter 10 does cite 1-5 TRfAs MONGE, supra note 13.
27. 206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'g Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 1953).
THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO RICANS
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rather now applied as a result of the consent of the Puerto Rican people.28
While the Court of Appeals reserved judgment on the inevitable further
question-whether the Fourteenth Amendment now applied to the island
instead of the Fifth29-the court's refusal to accept the District Court's
reasoning concerning the constitutional implications of Puerto Rico's new
"Commonwealth" status arguably sheds some light on the question of
whether Congress entered into a compact relinquishing part of its
sovereignty over the island. The omission of these cases from a discussion
of the origins and meaning of Puerto Rico's status is puzzling.30
The final chapters turn to the present, offering a striking and powerful
indictment of Puerto Rico's colonial dilemma. Providing a much-needed
model of civility and constructive dialogue, Trias Monge fairly and
impartially places the blame where blame is due: not only upon Congress,
but also on all the political parties in Puerto Rico, which have engaged in a
bitter and nasty debate, often misleading the people in the service of political
aims. Trias Monge's description of the effects of continued colonial status
makes an invaluable contribution to a discussion too often stymied by
defensive claims that the United States has been a relatively benevolent
master. While true (for whatever "benevolent" imperialism is worth),
colonial status has deeply divided Puerto Rico, distorting and distracting its
political life, and constantly reminding its people that, for whatever reason,
they are not welcome as full and equal participants of the Union. In the
Chapter 15, Trias Monge reiterates his call for a clear Congressional
response, offering the vague contours of his own ideas for an "enhanced"
Commonwealth status. Given the repeated rejections of such proposals in the
past, the chapter raises again the question of the missing constitutional
jurisprudence.
Trias Monge, of course, knows the constitutional jurisprudence cold;
the omission of this material is obviously the result of a deliberate but
curious decision. The book explains and challenges Puerto Rico's colonial
status but scarcely mentions the federal constitutional framework that
governs. The few exceptions include an eight-page discussion of the Insular
Cases of 1901-05 in Chapter 4 (pp. 44-48); an occasional comment
questioning the applicability of the Territorial Clause to Puerto Rico; and
several implicit references to constitutional arguments by way of their
summary rejection, primarily in Chapter 14. Yet the book is devoid of
analysis concerning the post-1952 case law that discusses "Commonwealth"
status. Instead, it looks to the Autonomic Charter, the Statute of
Westminster, and a selection of models granting varying degrees of

28. See id. at 382 (declining to decide what lower court had decided in dicta in Mora, 113
F. Supp. at 318-319).

29.

Justice Rehnquist subsequently ruled out this possibility, albeit in dicta, in Examining

Bd. v. Floresde Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 606-07 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting on other grounds).

30.

For a similar criticism, see Juan R. Torruella, jHacia d6nde vas Puerto Rico?, 107

YALE L.J. 1503 (1998).
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"autonomy" and "sovereignty" to territories in situations similar to Puerto
Rico's. Why?
In part, one suspects the answer lies in Trias Monge's apparent
judgment that U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is basically irrelevant to
Puerto Rico's status. The following statement suggests as much: "There are
no limits to the arrangements that can be worked out between a former
colonial power and its possessions. The Constitution of the United States is
not such a quirky document that it deprives the nation of possibilities open to
others to shed an ill-fitting colonial dress" (pp. 170-71). If this is right, then
whatever light American constitutional jurisprudence can shed on the status
of its territories is indeed irrelevant. If, in the end, the federal Constitution
is not so "quirky" as to limit the Congress' power to act with respect to the
territories, then a review of this book obviously belongs in a journal on
international law.
Trias Monge does explain, without delving into detail, the basic
positions in the constitutional debate. In brief, one side (generally the
supporters of Commonwealth status) has argued that when Puerto Rico
became a Commonwealth, the island acquired a certain degree of
sovereignty and the people of Puerto Rico entered into a "bilateral compact"
with the United States, whose provisions may be modified only by mutual
consent. The other side (generally the supporters of statehood and
independence) has insisted that even had it wanted to do so, Congress could
not have entered into such a compact, primarily because its plenary power
under the Territorial Clause would not allow it to make a permanent, partial
grant of sovereignty. The former believe that if Congress' power is plenary,
then Congress must have virtually unlimited power to enter into relationships
with its territories. The latter believe that Congress' "plenary" power is
nonetheless limited by other provisions of the Constitution: Congressional
action with respect to a territory would necessarily take the form of
legislation; Congress' authority to legislate with respect to the territories
derives from a constitutional provision, the Territorial Clause; one Congress
cannot by legislation bind a subsequent Congress' constitutional power. A
compact that can be legislated away by a subsequent Congress, goes the
argument, is no compact at all.
Although he does not discuss the case law, Trias Monge dismisses the
latter argument in Chapter 14. He rejects the "quaint notion that autonomist
options based on the mutual consent idea are not open to the United States
because supposedly one Congress cannot tie the hands of another" (p. 171).
This statement, together with the author's confidence that the Constitution
cannot be so "quirky" as to forbid creative solutions to the status problem,
effectively communicates Trias Monge's disdain for what he considers
unimaginative constitutional objections-he calls them "fanciful legal
objections" and "dated legalisms" (pp. 167 and 171)-to the
"enhancements" to Commonwealth status. He goes on: "The Insular Cases
interpreted the United States Constitution to mean that the United States
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could acquire and govern colonies. It would be simply astounding to hold
that it cannot permanently divest itself of the power to govern them to the
extent that the national interest should dictate" (p. 171).
Yet this claim casts doubt on Trfas Monge's decision to put aside
American constitutional jurisprudence, for it makes clear that his proposed
status alternatives inevitably depend on the answer to a constitutional
question: whether the Congress may permanently divest itself of some of its
power to govern its territories. It is neither astounding nor quaint to say that
a Congress cannot by legislation bind a subsequent Congress' constitutional
power. This may not allow as imaginative a solution as one would like, but
if it is correct, and Congress cannot permanently, partially divest itself of its
sovereignty over Puerto Rico, the Statute of Westminster and the Autonomic
Charter of 1897 will not make any difference.
Perhaps Trias Monge is right. Perhaps the Congress has the power to
enter into any number of permanent arrangements involving partial grants of
its sovereignty to other political bodies, which would in turn become neither
states nor colonies but something in between. Perhaps, as he puts it in
Chapter 14, "sovereignty, like the atom, can be split" (p. 170),"'
permanently. This position, however, is not obvious, and it requires more
attention than Trias Monge gives it here. Trfas Monge, a preeminent legal
scholar who counts among his works a five-volume constitutional history of
Puerto Rico, 32 has indeed paid closer attention to these questions. But this
latest book purports to reduce the question of status to its essence. Without a
discussion of the constitutional implications of his proposed Congressional
act, the question remains whether a partial and permanent grant of
sovereignty to an entity other than a state of the Union would not
fundamentally alter the structure of the Union.
The choice to put aside the constitutional arguments raises yet another
question: where is the Young Bill?33 This bill, vigorously debated in Puerto
Rico and bitterly opposed by the Commonwealth Party, recently passed in
the U.S. House of Representatives by a single vote. Extensively debated in
the press in Puerto Rico a year before the publication of Trias Monge's
book, the bill attempts to provide a clear answer to Trias Monge's own
question: "Choose what?" The answer, as originally written into the bill,
was either statehood or independence; the bill omitted the Commonwealth
option altogether, on the reasoning that the continuation of this status is
constitutionally problematic.34 The Commonwealth Party roared.
Commonwealth status was added, sans enhancements. All of this happened
in 1996 and early 1997. Why is there no mention of it in Trias Monge's
book?35
31.
32.

This is an infelicitous simile, since an atom, once split, is no longer an atom.
1-5 TRIAS MONGE, supra note 13.

33. United States-Puerto Rico Political Status Act, H.R. 856, 105th Cong. (1998).
34. Interview with Manase Mansur, Advisor on Insular and International Affairs, House
Committee on Resources (Aug. 1998) (on file with author).
35. See H.R. 3024, 104th Cong. (1996). This was the original version of the Young Bill,
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As a matter of international law, Congress has the "power," according
to the words in the Territorial Clause, to divest itself partially and
permanently of its sovereignty. Certainly the words of the clause, standing
alone, do not limit Congress' power; it is easy to concede, as a logical
exercise, that the lesser power follows from the greater. But the Territorial
Clause does not stand alone. As a matter of domestic law, that power is
defined and limited by other parts of the Constitution setting forth the
structure of American federalism. If Congress divests itself partially and
permanently of sovereignty over a territory, it creates an entity that does not
exist anywhere in the Constitution-not in Articles I, II, or III, not in the
Territorial Clause, not anywhere. It is the Constitution as a whole, not any
inherent limitation in the text of the Territorial Clause itself, that limits
Congress' power to split its sovereignty.
Luis Mufioz Matin stood before Congress in 1952, prior to the
adoption of the Commonwealth Constitution, and argued forcefully that the
new "Commonwealth" status would not perpetuate inequality, as it would be
"'unthinkable that a free people, a people worthy of American citizenship,
should go to the polls and vote for a status that they conceive as one of
inequality"' (p. 116). As Trias Monge tells it:
The gnawing feeling that these words were not fully heeded in the course of
establishing the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, that the resulting relationship still had
not been adequately purged of all of its colonial connotations, clearly impelled Mufioz
Marin to dedicate the rest of his years to efforts to add to the powers of the Puerto
Rican people within a framework of association with the United States (p. 116).

That gnawing feeling must have come from Mufioz Marin's recognition,
deep down, that nimble sleight of hand would never slip Commonwealth
status past very real constitutional objections. Using sleight of hand to slip
this status past a people worthy of American citizenship proved easier;
ironically, it undermined that very citizenship. Trias Monge's nimble pen
may have moved lightly over U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, but this
should not diminish the accomplishment of his important, insightful, and
engaging book. Heeding his call for civility, we must now embark on a
dialogue worthy of American citizens.

Environmental Issues
Trade and the Environment : A Comparative Study of the EC and United
States Law. By Damien Geradin. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997. Pp. xxiii, 231. Price: $64.95. (Hardcover). Reviewed by
Jean Albert.
which excluded the Commonwealth option altogether. The recently passed Young Bill is perceived by
many as an attempt to force statehood on Puerto Rico, and the omission of Commonwealth from the
original version as an insult to the Puerto Rican people's power of self-determination. Perhaps this is
why Trias Monge deems it unworthy of discussion.

